

# States and Nationalism

MICHAEL HERZFELD

## Abstract

Nationalism, especially in the form that links national identity and statehood, is in its present form a relatively recent but highly successful and pervasive invention. Grounded in metaphors of shared blood and collective inheritance (including the idea of national culture as patrimony or heritage), it still displays unexpected staying power despite concern over its negative history as “ethnonationalism” and as the translation of superficially benign ideologies into doctrines of violent exclusion and genocide. Modern nation-states, also unexpectedly, often encapsulate segmentary models of collective identity; nationalism may appear in everyday (“banal”) activities, the less respectable of which—as intimate zones of sociability—it may seek to hide behind official images of cultural and genetic homogeneity. Current research focuses on the practices that link idealized national identity to their realization and subversion in social and bodily experience and performance.

## EARLY CONCERNS

Despite predictions of the imminent demise of nationalism, countries that had seemed unconcerned about the plethora of sometimes fluid minority identities within their borders had begun, by the 1990s, to seem fixated on the creation of national purity. From the Balkans to South Asia, and from the Caucasus to Rwanda, blood flowed in direct proportion to its symbolic importance as the sign of a biologically inherited, shared culture. Although states can exist without nationalism, recent experience suggests that this is a rare achievement. Nationalism is thus once again, and to an unprecedented degree, of immediate, global concern.

The relationship between states and nationalism can be succinctly summarized. States are bureaucratic engines of reification; they create borders, not only cartographically, but also semantically. Indeed, the word “definition” comes from the Latin root *finis*, “earthwork,” a structure that defined the territorial limits of ancient cities. Ethnicity, which anthropologists from Evans-Pritchard (1940: 125–132, 217–228) (in a case now extremely relevant to the warfare occurring in South Sudan) to Barth (1969), labored hard to

detach from its static conceptualization as a type of fixed identity, becomes the basis of the nation-state, each rendering the other as both inevitable and inextricably interconnected. In their recognition of the contingent nature of national identity, however, they were anticipated by Renan's (1882) celebrated description of the nation as defined by "the shared possession of a rich sediment of memories" and "the desire to live together, the will to keep valuing the heritage that has been bequeathed in its entirety." Although the second part of this attempt at a definition appears to evoke the current rhetoric of heritage and history (see, e.g., Daniel, 1996: 13–42; Hayden, 2002; Lowenthal, 1985), the notion that a group of people must actively desire to cohabit anticipates the critiques of nationalistic claims on common sense and nature that have dominated anthropological and some other social science thinking since the 1970s. Smith's work (1995) comes closest to Renan's insistence on the role of the collective will and to Renan's rejection of the "primordialist" (Geertz, 1973: 259–261) view of nationalism—the idea that an ethnic group was inherently entitled to its own territorial state. *Nationism*, a term favored by Gregory Lobo (2014), places the nation clearly at center stage as an object of worship around which leaders build powerful notions of belonging, thereby distracting attention from their own failings.

Perhaps because of the historical legacy of mid-twentieth century fascism, social scientists have largely treated nationalism as both tending toward exclusionary, often violent acts and on the brink of disappearance. Nationalism, in its familiar forms, really only emerged in eighteenth century Europe, although national states have existed in other times and places. Some expected it to fade with the rise of supranational European and other structures. But numerous newly minted nationalisms cast themselves in terms of familiar metaphors of blood and kinship, thus investing their common ideology with an air of naturalness, inevitability, and territorial rootedness.

So thorough is this process of *naturalization*—a term built into nationalist practices in the bestowal of national citizenship—that even in a notoriously uneven history of national unification, that of Italy, one of the most stringent critics of national pride, Giambattista Vico, was claimed by *Risorgimento* intellectuals as a spiritual ancestor and representative of transcendent Italian genius. In Germany, where the theories of Johann Gottfried von Herder were more plausibly adumbrated to the emergence of national identity, and whence these ideas spread rapidly through the pan-European development of national folklore studies (e.g., Herzfeld, 1982; Wilson, 1976), the fusion of state, nation, and nature itself came to its most intense formulation during the Nazi period (Kamenetsky, 1977; Linke, 1997). The serious scholarly work of linguists was usurped by such movements to create arguments about an "Aryan civilization" that not only informed the entire racial "science" of

Nazism but even subsequently spread to such countries as Sri Lanka (Daniel, 1996: 55).

Such misuses of scholarship did not dupe the entire academic world; archaeologist Clark (1939: 197–206; see also Arnold, 1990), for example, wrote a sharp condemnation. Rich critiques of nationalistic appropriation of archaeology have addressed more recent instances (e.g., Abu El-Haj, 2001: 127–129; Kohl, 1998; Kohl and Fawcett, 1995). Social anthropologists, too, have addressed the ways in which nationalism and local identities affected each other. A foundational text is Evans-Pritchard's *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica* (1949). Although Evans-Pritchard was a strong advocate of distinguishing between segmentary and pyramidal societies—in other words, between those based on the internal governance of the genealogically organized feud and those centrally organized around a formal bureaucracy—he clearly showed how a segmentary and tribal society could evolve, however incompletely, into a pyramidal and national entity, that of Libya. There, opposition to an external power (Italy), seen as representing the most inclusive type of clan from the Bedouin perspective, provoked the coagulation of all the different tribal groups.

Such nation-states often retain elements of segmentary organization; Shryock's (1997) work on Jordan usefully shows how competing, kinship-based factions struggle to claim historical truth for themselves while denying it to their opponents. They operate within a single shared idiom; their disputes thus paradoxically help to forge cultural unity. Segmentation does not disappear with the creation of a centralized nation-state, but it may represent a hidden dimension of the collective dynamic (see also Eriksen, 1993: 158). Thus, in Thailand the erstwhile “pulsating galactic polity” (Tambiah, 1976: 115)—a fundamental segmentary arrangement of local powers—reappears in forms of resistance to the centralized bureaucracy that was installed during the “modernizing” phase of Thai history as a way of placating the colonial powers and preventing them from invading the newly reconstituted Siamese polity (see Herzfeld 2016, forthcoming).

Twentieth century work on nationalism displays a growing awareness that it represents a relatively recent reorganization of local social orders; often violates the complexity of the existing sociocultural terrain; and bureaucratizes not only governance (the state) but also culture (the nation), moving from processual models to rigid reification.

### CLASSIC FORMULATIONS

Three post-World War II treatments of nationalism stand out as particularly influential. Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism* (1983) exemplifies the liberal critique of nationalist extremism. Where the Marxist historian

Hobsbawm (1990) saw the rise of nationalism as a product of bourgeois domination, Gellner was more concerned to explore the reasons for its frequent degradation into violent forms of exclusion. Gellner (1983: 138) saw it as a radically modern phenomenon, characterized by three invariant features: literacy, homogeneity, and anonymity. His insistence that nationalism was the result of a deliberate spreading of “high culture”—an anthropologically suspect term—blinded him to how elite formulations of national identity only gained purchase because they built on the preexisting cosmology of the newly incorporated and often illiterate populations. He also considered Islamic nationalisms radically different from their Western equivalents in that, instead of relegating the remnants of the feudal past to a purely symbolic or ceremonial role, they required continuing fealty to these—in his view—outmoded concepts (Gellner, 1983: 79–80). In this regard, he anticipated modern Western right-wing rhetoric more than he did his own discipline.

Arguably the most influential of the three, political scientist Benedict Anderson (1983) attempted through his remarkable “imagined communities” thesis to ask how so many states could persuade citizens to die and kill in the name of such an abstract, recent concept. Their coercive power may be sufficient, if not to control “hearts and minds,” then at least to demand outward conformity. When the Thai and Turkish governments expect their citizens to stand to attention in the street during the daily playing of a national anthem, they are controlling bodies rather than minds; but docile bodies, as Foucault (1977: 135–169) has so ably demonstrated, make for effective governance. Anderson’s question is more interesting, however, when addressed to the self-sacrifices that people are willing to make *before* and *for* the creation of the nation-state, when the nationalist ideology is quite new. Greeks, for example, mostly did not think of themselves as “Hellenes” before 1770, and were reluctant even to countenance the idea that they were descended from these mythical pagan giants; thus, the fervor of the 1821 revolution does demand explanation. Even if we dismiss the retrospective reconstruction of the guerrillas known as *klefts* (literally, thieves) as heroes of the national struggle and see them instead as self-interested bandits (St. Clair, 1972: 37–39, 103–110), it is hard to see why so many were willing to die for the cause of a nation still, and for a long time to come, controlled by external interests. To say that the *klefts* were trying to throw off the yoke of heavy taxation hardly explains anything, since most of them were not paying their taxes anyway. Similarly, despite the apotheosis of the Boston Tea Party (most recently and most virulently led by the right wing of the Republican Party), it is hard to imagine that the idea of an “American nation” was a *necessary* outcome of revolt.

A difficulty with Anderson's argument is that it rests too heavily on assumptions about the psychological process of imagination. Performances of affect are important to the public confirmation of loyalty, as witness the outpourings of grief at North Korean leader Kim Il Jong's funeral, but they do not necessarily represent people's actual feelings. *Imaging* might have been a better term for what Anderson describes; the semiotic principle of "iconicity"—the principle of resemblance, whether genetic or cultural—transforms the idea of familial homogeneity into a national coherence (as in the motto *E pluribus unum*) at the level of a collective representation. Performance and semiosis, not thought processes, produce the palpable forms of nationalism.

Anderson's thesis nevertheless remains compelling in important respects. First, it was the first to raise the central "why" question without tracing all nationalisms to a unified European source. Had Anderson only penned those few pages on the role of the novel in galvanizing Philippine identity, his book would have profoundly affected our understanding. But Anderson also theorized the appeal of nationalism in innovative terms. Neither his own nor any other single-stranded explanation, however, is likely to stand the test of comparative critique.

#### CONTEMPORARY TRENDS AND QUESTIONS

Various scholars have attempted to wrestle with the unexpected, continuing importance of nationalism. Some have critically analyzed nationalisms based on myths of national homogeneity. Befu's (2001) notable study shows Japanese insistence on the internal coherence and purity of Japanese culture to be largely a myth. Nevertheless, that ideology is reproduced in artisanal production in ways that suggest that conformity is at least a cultural ideal (Kondo, 1990). Other scholars have singled out nationalisms based on racial, cultural, or religious exclusion, as in Tambiah's (1989, 1992) trenchant critiques of "ethnonationalism." The conflicts in Sri Lanka, the former Yugoslavia, Myanmar, and now the Crimea all illustrate the easy conversion of ethnic loyalty into "ethnic cleansing" through an obsession with symbolic purity (and conversely with "pollution" by others).

Other scholars have returned to religion for insight. Thus, Gregory Lobo's answer is that the nation itself transcends the pettiness of human governance and becomes a worthy object of a virtual millenarian cult. Indeed, some nationalisms were born of actual cults, as in Papua New Guinea (e.g., Worsley, 1957), while similar movements fomented rebellion against what were seen as oppressive majoritarian states (e.g., Bowie, 2014, on Thailand).

As Gellner (1983: 56–57) noted early on, Durkheim's celebrated definition of religion works *a fortiori* for nationalism. Gellner, however, did not explore

why Durkheim's argument works better for nationalism than for religion, in part because, none too presciently, he rejected religion as the basis for modern nationalism. While we cannot access the minds of long-lost religious leaders, and so cannot disinter the process whereby the collective cohesion Durkheim professed to find in religion was actually invented, we can do exactly that for nationalism. Precisely because nationalisms are created, as Gellner recognized, by bourgeois elites, the process of their invention, although conveniently suppressed in their own propaganda (which lays claim to an eternal and natural status), is usually traceable through the normal channels of historical research. Thus, for example, in investigating the creation of post-Ottoman, Turkish republican nationalism, we discover that the main architect of the Turkish constitution, Ziya Gökalp, was a passionate admirer of Durkheim's ideas. It is hardly surprising that one sees a carefully orchestrated effervescence (to recall one of Durkheim's favorite tropes) at every spot a Turkish radio can reach with the national anthem.

Bruce Kapferer (1988) has offered a distinctive approach that implicitly builds on the Durkheimian tradition (although he attributes it more to Louis Dumont). His formulation points us in the direction of another key question, one not raised by Anderson: why do nationalisms, with their promises of inclusion and redemption, so often morph into catastrophic violence? Comparing the masculine, "mateship" egalitarianism of Australian nationalism and the ostensible pacifism of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, Kapferer asks how the first came to provide the context for some spectacularly nasty forms of racism and sexism, while the second is the backdrop to a vicious campaign of genocide (now repeated in Myanmar). He suggests that a Dumontian model of "encompassment" allows us to see how all such "generous" ideologies are necessarily and logically exclusionary. He also treats nationalism as a religion, with its concomitant rituals; certainly, if Billig (1995: 9) is right to see the United States as a nationalistic country in its everyday ("banal") performances of belonging, or if my own argument about bureaucratic actions such as stamping documents similarly suggests ritual in the furtherance of a quasi-religious ideal (Herzfeld, 1992: 17–18), then the exclusion of outsiders through apparently "trivial" (Özkırmılı, 2005: 119) bureaucratic acts parallels the violent history of some of the most ostensibly peace-loving religious systems. Kapferer's argument foreshadows Handelmann's (2004) performance-oriented understanding of Israeli nationalism, in which bureaucratic logic is given potentially discriminatory force through repeated productions—forms of secular ritual, as it were, paralleling my own coinage of "secular theodicy"—in the public sphere. Handelmann's more general argument, that national bureaucracies are machines for the performance of systems of classification, underscores the symbolic nature of the state itself. In related vein, Scott (1998) sees the state as demanding the *legibility* of its

citizenry—a goal that adherence to a common language and performance idioms advances.

Indeed, one can “perform the nation,” not only through spectacles that reproduce and inculcate the bureaucratic logic of the state’s view of national identity (for a remarkable example, see Bowie, 1997), but also through song and dance officially acknowledged as national culture but sometimes implicitly opposed to elite values (see Askew, 2002: 288, on Tanzania). Such analyses take folklore out of the archive and back into everyday life; today mass-mediated performances may also reveal to the perceptive ethnographer some of the collective secrets of the nation (see Shryock, 2004). Performance is also a crafted activity that makes authenticity “real,” whether for tourists or in relation to the state’s management of ethnicity (Zhu, 2012; see also Eriksen, 1993: 118–120). The dimension of performance thus provides the missing link between theories of national identity and the state’s achievement of control over its formulation, and shows us, as I will illustrate in the next section, how unofficial attitudes and cultural traits also contribute—despite their non-normativity—to the emergence of a sense of nationhood.

#### Significant recent research and directions

We still need an adequate explanation of the power of the kinship metaphor even when it is stretched to accommodate such an impossibly vast scale. Although much of the work on nationalism and the state has been done by anthropologists working from local field research, the top-down formulations of writers such as Gellner and the very different Huntington (1996) have disproportionately influenced public discourse, as Özkırımlı (2005: 191) has noted. Ethnography, it seems, does not sell. But it does offer clues that earlier research, too focused on ideology and the “big picture,” failed to grasp.

I begin with the idea that kinship groups, especially families (Panourgiá, 1995), do not always behave according to their own stated ideals, and that this naughtiness is part of what makes them so dear to their members. In some cases, these metaphors represent transmutations of prenatal formations, as in the adoption by the Turkish Republic of a modified version of the Ottoman formula (Delaney, 1995). Furthermore, kin groups are often corporate owners of property. The landholdings of a family easily become a metaphor for national territory (as the house does for the protection of its interests, often gendered as female (see Yanagisako & Delaney, 1995; Mankekar, 1999). More complex in its origins and interpretation is the notion of a culture, and of heritage, as the collective property of a nation.

Nation-states are like families in ways that neither states nor families would want to acknowledge. They succeed in commanding loyalty when it becomes clear that they will tolerate a certain degree of disobedience—a disobedience couched in culturally familiar idioms (Herzfeld, 2005).

The so-called “klefts” (guerrilla fighters) supported the Greek war of independence because it undermined an existing authority, the Ottoman administration, and so became the model for the way citizens of the new state would imagine themselves: rambunctious, naughty, and cunning. Those who continued in this vein after the consolidation of national power, however, found themselves quickly in disgrace (and sometimes in jail). But the self-image of the insubordinate citizen persisted, and constituted a challenge to the legitimacy of the state at two levels. On the one hand, the tax-evading, “corrupt” stereotype represented a genuine problem as too much punishment of those imitating a heroic model would risk alienating the entire populace. On the other, its centrality to the self-presentation of Greece to the rest of the world, and especially to the European Union, has compromised the country’s legitimacy.

Outsiders demand reform. But aside from the fact that this is not easily done, it would actually alienate a large segment of the population by repressing the very things that citizens guiltily enjoy. Whoever heard of a national government endorsing seamy jokes, for example? But they are nevertheless as much a part of the culture, and arguably a more familiar one than all the grand ideals that are trotted out at anniversary celebrations and in monumental inscriptions. What really commands the loyalty of citizens, I suggest, is the knowledge that the state will always connive at archetypical infractions representative of what I have called *cultural intimacy*. That knowledge, so precious to social life and yet so inadmissible in official discourse, makes the nation—an abstraction made real by its translation into kinship metaphors—worthy of the ultimate sacrifice. In other words, people may be less invested in subsuming their personal mortality in a generic immortality, as Anderson argues, than in preserving the conditions that mortality makes precious. The converse of national heritage (Anderson’s reaching for immortality) is “corruption” (corruption of the flesh being the cause of historical time and therefore of mortality), and that neither holds much meaning without the other (see Herzfeld, 2014).

Even political scientist Billig (1995: 10, 14–15), who is uncomfortable with some aspects of Anderson’s thesis, accepts his concept of imagination. Yet consider the Turkish citizens who stand to attention for the anthem: they are not necessarily imagining anything beyond their immediate purview, but they are fitting themselves to an image. Their bodies, like those of the Chinese athletes described by Brownell (1995), are retrofitted to an entity expanded from a more generic model of personhood. At stake here is not a psychological process, but the cultural management of resemblance or, as we might put it in semiotic terms, iconicity—the creation of resemblance as the basis for consensus.



Naming symbolizes this play of similarity and difference, as in the contrasted responses of Greek nationalists to the self-naming of Romania and Macedonia. Architect of modern Greek folklore studies and sometime diplomat Nikolaos Politis was adamant that it would be unreasonable for the Greeks to take the name “Romania” for themselves even though it had been their collective name in what he dubbed the national epic of the Hellenes, apparently because it alluded to the post-classical era (Herzfeld, 1982: 128). But Greek nationalists have never applied the same logic to the case of Macedonia, arguing that this ancient name was “theirs” and that the “Skopjans” (as they call them after the republic’s capital city) should simply find another name. Sutton (1997) has persuasively argued, from the evidence of a direct parallel between the inheritance of personal names and the inheritance of land, that for Greeks the name of Macedonia is tightly bound to Greece’s territorial integrity mapped onto a particular reading of its past.

In some languages, the terms *heritage* display patrilineal overtones redolent of older European aristocratic systems of descent and inheritance. Thus, in French, *patrimoine* is implicitly the birthright of a people, an inheritance from the forefathers. Richard Handler, in several publications (Handler, 1985a, 1985b, 1988), has demonstrated that in nineteenth-century nationalism culture itself was reified as a possession—not without help from some early anthropologists, whose successors still sometimes experience difficulty in ridding the term of its static implications and treating it instead as a process. Although Québec, the case studied by Handler, never achieved full independence, its adherence to the logic of the *patrimoine* nicely illustrates the political process through which “having a culture” becomes the state-level equivalent of landowning. Nations in which the equivalent terms—often legalistic translations from French or English—do not have comparable inheritance systems at the local level seem also to evince relative difficulty in marshaling emotion in defense of “national heritage,” although most can point to something akin to “tradition” as the repository of their reified national culture. In pre-modern Europe, a person without land was not a complete person, so Handler’s argument goes; thus, failing to acquire a national culture was a mark of incomplete nationhood.

#### SUGGESTIONS FOR NEW RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

What these insights show is that much more work is now needed, especially from historians, on how the terminology of nationhood and “return” (e.g., Voutira, 2003; Handelman, 2004: 44–51) and the practice of heritage conservation and reconstruction have been adopted by various states; the *International Journal of Heritage Studies* is becoming an important venue for the exploration

of the latter topic. We also need to see more research on the impact of supranational entities—the EU, ASEAN, and others now in a more provisional condition—on both the creation of cultural commonalities (on the EU, see Shore, 2000) and on the weakening of national identities and the concomitant strengthening of regional ones; the examples of Russia and the former Yugoslavia show that the demise of one nationalism can actually give birth to several smaller but arguably more intense new ones. At the same time, efforts to maintain peaceful coexistence within a single “umbrella state” are not yet well understood, although a few detailed studies (see especially the special section on educational policies and practices in *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 13: 277–393) have now begun to show the way.

At the same time, it has also become imperative to understand what has happened under the same circumstances to that inner-directed—but equally intense—dynamic that corresponds to the zone of cultural intimacy—the social dimension of nationalism, already emphasized in different ways by Eriksen (1993) and Özkırımlı (2005). Do the new regional identities display similar characteristics? That Italians commonly display the same affection and defensiveness about local culture that Greeks are more inclined to deploy for national identity is highly suggestive.

New research on migration, diasporas, ethnic solidarity across borders, and refugee politics and asylum, while too wide-ranging to discuss in detail here, are necessarily interdisciplinary (here perhaps following the example set by Anthony D. Smith) and will help to illuminate the future trajectory of the various forms of nationalism that have dominated the headlines or begun to emerge quietly in the background but bid fair to play a more central role as the West’s power either declines or becomes more diffuse and other cultural traditions of personhood generate new configurations of national identity. In this development, the role of local ethnography and archival research on the new media as well as on diplomatic records will be central, displacing, one hopes, the excessive generalizing that has made nationalism an easy target for critique but a difficult area for generating understanding of what is a dynamic and ever-changing set of phenomena.

## REFERENCES

- Abu El-Haj, N. (2001). *Facts on the ground: Archaeological practice and territorial self-fashioning in Israeli Society*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Arnold, B. (1990). The past as propaganda: Totalitarian archaeology in Nazi Germany. *Antiquity*, 64, 464–478.
- Askew, K. M. (2002). *Performing the nation: Swahili music and cultural politics in Tanzania*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Barth, F. (1969). *Ethnic groups and boundaries. The social organization of culture difference*. Oslo, Norway: Universitetsforlaget.

- Befu, H. (2001). *Hegemony of homogeneity: An anthropological analysis of Nihonjinron*. Melbourne, Australia: Trans Pacific Press.
- Billig, M. (1995). *Banal nationalism*. London, England: Sage.
- Bowie, K. (1997). *Rituals of national loyalty: An anthropology of the state and the village scout movement in Thailand*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Bowie, K. (2014). The Saint with Indra's Sword: Kruubaa Srivichai and Buddhist Millenarianism in Northern Thailand. *Comparative studies in society and history*, 56, 681–713.
- Brownell, S. (1995). *Training the body for China: Sports in the moral order of the People's Republic*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Clark, J. G. D. (1939). *Archaeology and society*. London, England: Methuen.
- Daniel, E. V. (1996). *Charred lullabies: Chapters in an anthropography of violence*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Delaney, C. (1995). Father state, motherland, and the birth of Turkey. In S. Yanagisako & C. Delaney (Eds.), *Naturalizing power: Essays in feminist cultural analysis* (pp. 177–199). New York, NY: Routledge.
- Eriksen, T. H. (1993). *Ethnicity and nationalism: Anthropological perspectives*. London, England: Pluto Press.
- Evans-Pritchard, E. E. (1949). *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica*. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
- Foucault, M. (1977). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison* (Translated by Alan Sheridan). Harmondsworth, England: Penguin.
- Geertz, C. (1973). *The interpretation of cultures*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Handelman, D. (2004). *Nationalism and the Israeli State: Bureaucratic logic in public events*. Oxford, England: Berg.
- Handler, R. (1985a). On dialogue and destructive analysis: Problems in narrating nationalism and ethnicity. *Journal of Anthropological Research*, 41, 171–182.
- Handler, R. (1985b). On having a culture: Nationalism and the preservation of Quebec's Patrimoine. In G. Stocking (Ed.), *Objects and others (History of anthropology)* (Vol. 3, pp. 192–217). Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Handler, R. (1988). *Nationalism and the politics of culture in Quebec*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Hayden, R. M. (2002). Antagonistic tolerance: Competitive sharing of religious sites in South Asia and the Balkans. *Current Anthropology*, 43, 205–231.
- Herzfeld, M. (1982). *Ours once more: Folklore, ideology, and the making of modern Greece*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Herzfeld, M. (1992). *The social production of indifference: Exploring the symbolic roots of Western Bureaucracy*. Oxford, England: Berg.
- Herzfeld, M. (2005). *Cultural intimacy: Social poetics in the nation-state* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge.
- Herzfeld, M. (2014) (online version). Heritage and Corruption: The Two Faces of the Nation-State. *International Journal of Heritage Studies*, 21, 1–14. doi:10.1080/13527258.2014.948486

- Herzfeld, M. (2016). *Siege of the Spirits: Community and Polity in Bangkok*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. (1990). *Nations and nationalism since 1780: Programme, myth, reality*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Huntington, S. P. (1996). *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
- Kamenetsky, C. (1977). Folktale and ideology in the Third Reich. *Journal of American Folklore*, 90, 168–78.
- Kapferer, B. (1988). *Legends of People, Myths of State: Violence, Intolerance, and Political Culture in Sri Lanka and Australia*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Kohl, P. L. (1998). Nationalism and archaeology: On the constructions of nations and the reconstructions of the remote past. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 27, 223–46.
- Kohl, P. L., & Fawcett, C. (Eds.) (1995). *Nationalism, politics, and the practice of archaeology*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Kondo, D. K. (1990). *Crafting selves: Power, gender, and discourses of identity in a Japanese workplace*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Linke, U. (1997). *Blood and nation: The European aesthetics of race*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Lobo, G. 2014. What are Nations? Published 4 April 2014. <http://blog.libraryofsocialscience.com/what-are-nations-essay-by-gregory-lobo/>, last accessed 9 February 2015.
- Lowenthal, D. (1985). *The past is a foreign country*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Mankekar, P. (1999). *Screening culture, viewing politics: An ethnography of television, womanhood, and nation in postcolonial India*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Özkırımlı, U. (2005). *Contemporary debates on nationalism: A critical engagement*. Houndmills, England: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Panourgíá, N. (1995). *Fragments of death, fables of identity: An Athenian anthropography*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Renan, E. (1882). *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation ? : Conférence faite en Sorbonne, le 11 mars 1882*. Paris, France: Calmann Lévy.
- Scott, J. C. (1998). *Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Shore, C. (2000). *Building Europe: The cultural politics of European integration*. London, England: Routledge.
- Shryock, A. (1997). *Nationalism and the genealogical imagination: Oral history and textual authority in tribal Jordan*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Shryock, A. (Ed.) (2004). *Off stage/on display: Intimacy and ethnography in the age of public culture*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Smith, A. D. (1995). *Nations and nationalism in a global era*. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.
- St. Clair, W. (1972). *That Greece might still be free: The Philhellenes in the War of Independence*. London, England: Oxford University Press.
- Sutton, D. E. (1997). Local names, foreign claims: Family inheritance and national heritage on a Greek Island. *American Ethnologist*, 24, 415–437.

- Tambiah, S. J. (1976). *World conqueror and world renouncer: A study of Buddhism and polity in Thailand against a historical background*. Cambridge, England: University of Cambridge Press.
- Tambiah, S. J. (1989). Ethnic conflict in the world today. *American Ethnologist*, 16, 335–349.
- Tambiah, S. J. (1992). *Buddhism betrayed? Religion, politics, and violence in Sri Lanka*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Voutira, E. (2003). Refugees: Whose term is it anyway? Emic and Etic constructions of ‘refugees’ in modern Greek. In J. van Selm, K. Kamanga, J. Morrison, A. Nadig, S. S. Vrzina & L. van Willigen (Eds.), *The refugee convention at fifty: A view from forced migration studies* (pp. 65–80). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Wilson, W. A. (1976). *Folklore and nationalism in modern Finland*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Worsley, P. (1957). *The trumpet shall sound: A study of “cargo cults” in Melanesia*. New York, NY: Schocken Books.
- Yanagisako, S., & Delaney, C. (Eds.) (1995). *Naturalizing power: Essays in feminist cultural analysis*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Zhu, Y. (2012). Performing Heritage: Rethinking Authenticity in Tourism. *Annals of Tourism Research*, 39, 1495–1513.

#### MICHAEL HERZFELD SHORT BIOGRAPHY

**Michael Herzfeld** is Ernest E. Monrad Professor of the Social Sciences in the Department of Anthropology at Harvard University, where has taught since 1991. The author of eleven books—including *The Poetics of Manhood* (1985), *Cultural Intimacy* (1997), *The Body Impolitic* (2004), and *Evicted from Eternity* (2009)—and numerous articles and reviews, he has also produced two ethnographic films. He has served as editor of *American Ethnologist* (1995–1998) and is currently editor-at-large (responsible for “Polyglot Perspectives”) at *Anthropological Quarterly*. His research in Greece, Italy, and Thailand has addressed, *inter alia*, the social and political impact of historic conservation and gentrification, the discourses and practices of crypto-colonialism, social poetics, the dynamics of nationalism and bureaucracy, and the ethnography of knowledge among artisans and intellectuals.

#### RELATED ESSAYS

- Understanding American Political Conservatism (*Political Science*), Joel D. Aberbach
- Political Conflict and Youth: A Long-Term View (*Psychology*), Brian K. Barber
- Globalization Backlash (*Sociology*), Mabel Berezin
- Political Ideologies (*Political Science*), Edward G. Carmines and Nicholas J. D’Amico

The State and Development (*Sociology*), Samuel Cohn  
Globalization of Capital and National Policymaking (*Political Science*),  
Steven R. Hall  
Domestic Political Institutions and Alliance Politics (*Political Science*),  
Michaela Mattes  
The New Political Economy of Colonialism (*Political Science*), Thomas B.  
Pepinsky  
The Welfare State in Comparative Perspective (*Sociology*), Jill Quadagno *et al.*  
The Institutional Logics Perspective (*Sociology*), Patricia H. Thornton *et al.*  
Postsocialism (*Anthropology*), Elizabeth Cullen Dunn and Katherine Verdery  
Constitutionalism (*Political Science*), Keith E. Whittington