

Cultural Heritage, Patrimony, and Repatriation

RICHARD HANDLER

Abstract

In contemporary usage, the terms *cultural heritage* and *cultural patrimony* are synonyms. Both are metaphors that depict the idea that the culture (material and immaterial) of a specific social group is its property, owned collectively and passed on from one generation to the next. In the past 50 years, these terms have come to constitute a discursive space in which academic disciplines such as anthropology, archaeology, art history, and philosophy have interacted with professional disciplines such as law, museology, and architecture; and these university-based fields have had to interface with a much broader public, newly interested in what has come to be called the *politics of culture*. *Repatriation* is a term that signifies the return of cultural artifacts, from metropolitan institutions that had “collected” them to local communities that can claim to have created them. Repatriation has gained momentum since the Second World War, as both decolonization and various international conventions have provided a platform for once colonized peoples to claim items of their cultural heritage that had been taken from them. Repatriation is a directional process, from center to periphery. It includes both the return of artifacts and a ceding of control over the interpretation of such artifacts.

INTRODUCTION

In contemporary usage, the terms *cultural heritage* and *cultural patrimony* are synonyms. Both are metaphors that depict the idea that the culture (material and immaterial) of a specific social group is its property, owned collectively and passed on from one generation to the next. In the past 50 years, these terms have come to constitute a discursive space in which academic disciplines such as anthropology, archaeology, art history, and philosophy have interacted with professional disciplines such as law, museology, and architecture; and these university-based fields have had to interface with a much broader public, newly interested in what has come to be called the *politics of culture*. *Repatriation* is a term that signifies the return of cultural artifacts,

from metropolitan institutions that had “collected” them to local communities that can claim to have created them. Repatriation is a directional process, from center to periphery. It includes both the return of artifacts and a ceding of control over the interpretation of such artifacts.

FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH: CENTRAL CONCEPTS

CIVILIZATION AND CULTURE

The social-scientific study of culture and the institutionalization of programs to preserve cultural patrimony stem from the same sources, those that led to the rise of the nation-state, organized as a centralized bureaucracy, as the dominant form of sociopolitical organization in the modern world (Poggi, 1978); and to an individuating historical consciousness, one of modernity’s two approaches to the issue of historical temporality (Stocking, 1987; Trautmann, 1987). The two approaches to temporality are captured by the ongoing relationship of the terms *civilization* and *culture*, terms which, in European discourses over many centuries, have been defined and redefined but eventually came to represent, in their pairing, the tension between enlightenment rationality and scientific universalism, on the one hand, and its rejection in the historical particularism of romanticism, on the other hand (Elias, 1994, pp. 3–43; Stocking, 1963).

By the end of the nineteenth century, *civilization* had come primarily to indicate human progress as accumulated and displayed in the accomplishments of industry, science, government, and the arts. Proponents of civilization subscribed to a socioevolutionary understanding of human history, which was seen to move in one direction, from the “primitive” to the “civilized” (Rist, 1997). Civilization itself was unitary, not diverse, and its advance since the time of the “ancient” Greeks had come to be localized in Western Europe and North America. Civilization was a product of human rationality, which was at once universal (all human thinking would eventually arrive at the same ultimate truths) and particular to the most advanced “race,” the “whites” (Segal, 2000).

Proponents of culture celebrated human difference and validated the worthiness of particular, historically and geographically distinct, human traditions. The term *culture* could include the material products of human ingenuity, and thus technological, scientific, and artistic achievements, but in the twentieth century social sciences it came ultimately to refer to an inner, mental, or spiritual organization that was thought to characterize, and to be unique to, each society or people.

Cultures in this sense cannot be ranked: each life-way is a complete system of human meaning and action that makes the world comprehensible to

the people who live within it. Nor is culture cumulative across all human history, as civilization could be said to be. In a famous essay on “Culture, Genuine and Spurious,” Edward Sapir summarized the distinction between *civilization* and *culture* in this way: “Civilization, as a whole, moves on; culture comes and goes” (1924, p. 413). Oswald Spengler used a more elaborate metaphor that captures the opposition between enlightenment rationality and romantic particularism: “Each culture has its own new possibilities of self expression which arise, ripen, decay, and never return These cultures . . . grow with the same superb aimlessness as the flowers of the field. They belong . . . to the living nature of Goethe, and not to the dead nature of Newton” (1926, p. 21).

Culture came to be the particular disciplinary property, and central organizing concept, of anthropology as it developed in North America in the work of Franz Boas and his students. Through Boas, the German romanticism of the Humboldtian tradition of historical ethnography was transplanted to North America (Bunzl, 1996). Boasian or American cultural anthropology became institutionally dominant in the United States, the country that developed a far larger university system than any other modern state and, consequently, that produced the great majority of the world’s professional anthropologists in the twentieth century (Stocking, 2001, p. 290).

As George Stocking has shown (2001, p. 308), anthropology itself, as an academic discipline, emerged from different strands in European intellectual history (natural history, philology, moral philosophy, and antiquarianism), and its varying interests (in language, material culture, social organization, and customs) came to be institutionalized in different ways within the university systems of different countries. British anthropology, for example, came to focus on social structure, not culture, and in Great Britain the study of archaeology, which in the United States was one of the “four fields” of anthropology, was institutionalized elsewhere than in anthropology departments. Still, despite the differences among national anthropological traditions, the intellectual project encapsulated by the favored US term, *culture*, was central to all. And by the end of the twentieth century, the culture concept had come to be similarly used not only in most national anthropological traditions, but by the wider publics of modern societies.

PRESERVATION AND PROPERTY

Preservation—of historical buildings and monuments, and more generally of past ways of life—emerged as a concern in modern Europe and North America as one outcome of the great democratic revolutions. In its return to classical antiquity, the emergent historical consciousness of the European renaissance took profound note of historical difference, yet the preservation

of material artifacts (other than texts) was not part of this agenda. As David Lowenthal notes, “admirers of antiquity were less apt to save ancient temples ... than to mine them for their own creations: to extract marble from an old ruin was cheaper than to import it from Carrara” (1985, p. 390). It was in relation to the nineteenth- and twentieth century nationalisms that emerged from, and led to, political revolutions and independence movements that the preservation of the material artifacts of historically particular national pasts became important. Indeed, the onslaught of modernity (civilization) conveyed by dramatic political and socioeconomic changes lent urgency to nationalists’ sense that their particular cultures, embodied in a physical patrimony, were threatened and thus needed to be preserved.

The history of historic preservation in modern nation-states begins in the early nineteenth century both in local institutions such as museums and historical societies and in nation-wide regulation provided by laws (Hosmer, 1965, 1981; Nora, 1984; Wallace, 1996). By the middle of the twentieth century, such work was being carried on in different countries by well-established private and public institutions, while the establishment of the United Nations provided an institutional site for international efforts. The emergence of an anthropological conception of culture, encompassing all aspects of the life of a society, coincided with the expansion of preservation efforts from a narrow focus on buildings and monuments to a potentially unlimited project to preserve all aspects, material and immaterial, of a nationally or ethnically defined past (Handler, 1988, pp. 109–158). Thus, the modern concept of a world composed of distinct cultures and the nationalist desire to preserve the national patrimony have come to fit together well.

This conceptual fit, between culture and preservation, must also be explicated in terms of the idea of property (or heritage, or patrimony) that is centrally important to both. In their remarkable compendium of definitions of *culture*, A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn surveyed more than 150 different definitions, which they grouped in six different types. Of these types, only one (which they term *structural*, to highlight the idea of a patterned organization or system) fails to incorporate an idea that is something similar to the idea of heritage or patrimony. Their foundational definition comes from the first page of E. B. Tylor’s 1871 *Primitive Culture*: “culture ... is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952, p. 43; Tylor, 1871, p. 1).

The participial phrase, “acquired by man as a member of society,” is crucial, as it likens human socialization to the acquisition of property. Culture itself, in Tylor’s definition, is a collection of products that are transmitted over the generations, that is, heritage or patrimony. The underlying discourse is that

of modern “possessive individualism” (Macpherson, 1962) and the accompanying ideas of the social-contract theorists (especially John Locke). In this view, individuals in the “state of nature,” without any social prompting, act to create private property; these pre-societal, yet fully formed, individuals then choose, rationally, to create political or civil society in order to protect their property.

From the perspective of a fully cultural anthropology, such a foundational social theory is backwards: the desire for or understanding of private property can only be a function of societal values, not their cause. Dorothy Lee made a similar argument when she rejected the idea of culture as a response to some set of universal “basic needs” of human beings. As she pointed out, anthropologists and psychologists were constantly prompted to expand the list of basic human needs, as new research brought to their attention previously unimaginable values. She concluded that values were basic and needs derivative: “If, for example, physical survival was held as the ultimate goal in some society, it would probably be found to give rise to those needs which have been stated to be basic to physical survival; but I know of no culture where human physical survival has been shown, rather than unquestioningly assumed by social scientists, to be the ultimate goal” (Lee, 1948, p. 392).

Those unquestioning assumptions of social scientists, which are foundational to modern thought, make it easy for us to imagine culture as a system or machinery that generates products to satisfy our needs. In the early modern discourse of the contract theorists, individual property owners come together to form society—which can thus be seen as an institutional response to a basic human need for the protection of private property (Locke, 1960). In the nineteenth century discourses of both nationalism and the emergent social sciences, societies are imagined as property-bearing “collective individuals” (Dumont, 1977, pp. 47–60). The assumed need of such collective individuals to preserve their property has led again and again to heritage-preservation programs, which, as they have taken shape in nation-states around the globe (Bendix, Eggert, & Peselmann, 2012), have become prime sites for the generation of a kind of nationalistic, cultural self-consciousness.

CUTTING-EDGE RESEARCH: MATERIAL AND IMMATERIAL CULTURE

When we focus on culture as a system—usually, a system of ideas and values—culture is understood to be “immaterial.” When we focus on culture as the acting out of cultural values, then cultural products, or “material culture” and its “accumulation” over time, come into view. The conceptual distinction between material and immaterial culture is underpinned by Western body–mind dualism.

Strictly speaking, there should be no need for the distinction: all human creations and activities are cultural, and they all have both physical (material) and symbolic (immaterial) dimensions. A building is no more material than an evanescent act of communication (which depends on symbols that have a physical existence); and an act of communication is no more immaterial than a building, both of which are imbued with meanings which are not in the first instance physical. Yet, both modern anthropology (and its cognate disciplines) and cultural heritage programs have institutionalized the distinction between material and immaterial culture—a distinction embodied institutionally in the relationship of museums and universities.

MUSEUMS AND UNIVERSITIES

The disciplines most concerned with the kinds of collected objects that would become (sooner or later) subject to repatriation claims were anthropology, archaeology, art history, classics, and oriental studies. As noted earlier, in different national traditions, these areas of study were configured differently in relationship to one another within the institutions that housed them. Whether closely or loosely affiliated, or even unallied, together they were responsible for the collection, study, and preservation of the material culture of various pasts. The pasts of primitive peoples fell to anthropology and so-called prehistoric archaeology (Segal, 2000, pp. 774–775). The pasts of prior civilizations—Greece, Rome, Egypt, the “Near East,” and medieval Christendom—that could be seen as leading to civilization itself, the unmarked category of modern Western civilization, fell to art history and classical archaeology. And the pasts of what were considered to be stalled, dead-end civilizations, such as India, Japan, and China, required various kinds of oriental studies.

Throughout the nineteenth century, these disciplines became located in two great modern institutions: the public museum and the research university. Museums of various kinds formed a vast “exhibitionary complex” (Bennett, 1995, pp. 59–88) meant to display the order of the universe, as revealed by science, to the emergent publics of modern nation-states. Most important for our purposes were museums of art, ethnology, and natural history. Over time, various types of heritage objects traveled between such museums; for example, primitive religious icons might be moved from an initial home in an ethnology or natural history museum to an art museum (Clifford, 1988, pp. 189–251). Still, by the turn of the twentieth century, we find a vast portion of the collected, material world heritage gathered together in a few dozen great metropolitan museums and scores of smaller, regional museums (Penny, 2002), institutions that would continue to add to their collections into the twenty-first.

The academic disciplines that developed to study cultures, civilizations, and their histories all had deep connections to both museums and universities. But over time, a split developed between the spiritual or theoretical side of those disciplines and the side devoted to the study and care of the material products or remains of past civilizations. For example, in the middle of the nineteenth century, anthropology began to emerge as a discipline through the activities of amateur ethnological societies, in Paris, New York, and London. Much nineteenth-century anthropological work entailed the collection of objects, whether cultural artifacts or the physical remains (skulls and skeletons) of human beings.

These collections must be seen as the signs and spoils of imperial conquest (Fine-Dare, 2002, pp. 13–46). Even as the United States, Canada, Australia, England, France, and other European nation-states colonized much of the rest of the world (including “first nations” within the settler societies), in a process that often included genocides, the front-line colonizers collected what they considered to be the material remains of the societies that advancing civilization had either engulfed or destroyed. They shipped those objects back to the metropolitan centers, to the newly established museums of archaeology, ethnology, and natural history. There they could be displayed to the public as proof of the superiority of their own civilization vis-à-vis those who had been conquered, colonized, displaced, or destroyed

Such museums provided an institutional home for anthropologists, who ventured out from them on collecting expeditions, and returned to them to catalogue, study, display, and store their spoils. In the same era, universities were beginning to create positions and departments in anthropology. At the turn of the twentieth century, Boas had positions at both Columbia University and the American Museum of Natural History. But museum work entailed attention to mass public education that clashed with the ethos of pure scientific work. Boas eventually abandoned the museum for the university (Jacknis, 1985), and by the early twentieth century, museums had become a professional “backwater” for anthropologists, the center of gravity of the discipline having moved to “more behaviorally oriented” research (Stocking, 1985, p. 8).

Similarly, art history became institutionalized as an academic discipline starting in the mid-nineteenth century. As early as the European renaissance, wealthy collectors had employed knowledgeable agents to collect objects of value. This split, between collecting objects and controlling the knowledge that authorized their value, widened as academic art history developed as the study of culture history in the German, romantic tradition. Art history came to be more concerned with the “spirit” of art, or with various kinds of culture theory that could explain it, than with the objects themselves, residing either

in museums or the homes of wealthy collectors. The development of technologies for the “mechanical reproduction” of artworks (Benjamin, 1968), principally photography, greatly abetted the process, as the teaching of art history in universities came to rely on the projection of images (using various kinds of “slides”) and their collection in mass-produced textbooks. As compared to anthropology, for which museum collections, by the mid-twentieth century, were not thought to hold the central data of the discipline, art history could never quite disavow the museum as a central repository of objects of study. Still, by mid-century, it was clear that there were two art histories, one residing in universities and the other in museums (Haxthausen, 2002).

AUTHENTICITY

A crucial aspect of the expert knowledge needed to collect and curate cultural heritage concerns authenticity. For our purposes, *authenticity* refers to the relationship between a heritage object and a social identity (Handler, 2001). In everyday language, we ask of such an object, “is it real?” But because the object in question exists in front of us, in an exhibition case or a museum storage space, our question is not ontological. Rather, we are asking, “has this object been produced by persons having such-and-such social identity”—in other words, “is this doll a real *Hopi* katchina doll?” or “was this landscape really painted by *Vermeer*?”

The answers to such questions turn out to be far more complicated than we might expect, as a long literature on the concept of authenticity attests (Bendix, 1997, Lindholm, 2008). It can be difficult to know with certainty who, or which individual, was the creator of a particular heritage object, even those produced within a recent Western tradition. For objects derived from traditions where the attribution to particular artists was not important, such questions are transmuted into questions about collective identity. Yet, the ways in which peoples and cultures have been identified in imperial and colonial writings—by travelers, traders, missionaries, administrators, and ethnographers—do not necessarily correspond to the social understandings of those people themselves (Cohen, 1978). Moreover, because Western writers imported modern ideas about the purity of so-called pre-contact cultural forms into their collecting practices, they tended to describe objects produced after the moment of contact as debased or inauthentic.

Thus, metropolitan museums were filled with objects held to represent the story of civilization and the cultures of simpler peoples, yet the identities of those peoples were precipitated out of the same long-term historical process that led to the collecting of their heritage. With respect to both peoples and their heritage, authenticity became a matter to be decided by outside experts, who were almost always museum and university professionals. Meanwhile,

the expertise concerning cultural heritage of indigenous peoples around the world could be dismissed on the grounds that such people were by definition inauthentic, as they lived in the post-contact period. Museums owned the “world’s” patrimony, and professional experts controlled the interpretation of it. But this situation began to change with decolonization following World War Two.

TRAVELING CULTURES

Culture has always “traveled” (Clifford, 1997, pp. 17–46; Urban, 2001). Throughout the millennia of human history, people have carried, traded, borrowed, or stolen merchandise, relics, rituals, incantations, tools, weapons, arts, crafts, music, and dances across any and all social boundaries and natural barriers. And people themselves have moved away from home, assimilated into new social groups, and returned to prior homes, migration being another means by which culture and cultural objects have traveled. In some cases, people have resisted what we would call cultural borrowing, in others they have welcomed it, but it is only in the modern era that such movements have been conceptualized in terms of individuated national and ethnic groups defined in part by the culture they possess—their heritage or patrimony. And as the idea of culture as a heritage to be owned and controlled by the groups who created it became widely accepted, the collecting practices that had filled museums and that continue to flourish in the worldwide antiquities market came to be seen in a new light, as theft. Hence, the current worldwide trend in favor of cultural repatriation—the return of heritage objects to their rightful collective owners.

REPATRIATION

Cultural heritage repatriation is today a prominent issue, but it is well to remember the many famous cases in which people sought the return of looted objects immediately, well before the emergence of heritage-protection laws. The Elgin or Parthenon Marbles present the paradigmatic case of cultural removal leading to ongoing demands for cultural repatriation. Almost immediately after Lord Elgin had pieces of the frieze sawn off and shipped to England in 1801, Greeks protested; such protest over this stolen patrimony has been an important theme in Greek nationalism ever since (Hitchens, 2008). Throughout the nineteenth century, North American Indians mourned the victims of genocides and protested the robbing of their graves and the confiscation of their ritual paraphernalia. As early as 1899, the Onondaga Nation brought suit against a private collector for the return of wampum belts (Fine-Dare, 2002, p. 92).

Over long, bleak decades, indigenous peoples within settler societies struggled to maintain their way of life, and as in the history of the US civil rights movement, their efforts gained new momentum after Second World War. The global geopolitical landscape was transformed by decolonization, and settler societies began to be transformed by what would come to be called *multiculturalism*—a social movement in which indigenous peoples (among other “minorities”) gained access to higher education (including, importantly, legal training) and fought for the return of their ancestral lands as well as other kinds of political, civil, and human rights.

Meanwhile, since the late nineteenth century, nation-states have been constructing a system of international regulations for the protection of cultural property. Scholars generally cite the Hague Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1899, revised 1907) and the Hague Convention concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War (1907) as the first international agreements outlawing “the destruction, pillage, looting or confiscation of works of art and other items of public or private cultural property in the course of armed conflicts” (Frigo, 2004, p. 367). Although it did not concern cultural property, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was an important milestone, as proponents of repatriation subsequently began to frame their cases in terms of the “human right” of a group to undisturbed possession of its cultural heritage (Robbins and Stamatopoulou, 2004). Conventions, treaties, and laws to regulate the sale or transfer of cultural property, and to prohibit looting, have proliferated since the 1950s, at the international, national, and subnational level (as in the laws of various US states to prohibit the looting of Indian graves; Fine-Dare, 2002, pp. 97–107). In the United States, NAGPRA (the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990) has been profoundly influential, requiring museums and federal agencies in possession of Native American remains and cultural items to make inventories of such items available to tribes, and giving tribes the right to repatriate those items which they can legitimately claim.

Questions about the legitimacy of a repatriation claim can be difficult to resolve, because within the framework of Western legal norms, claimants may not be able to prove they have a direct link (cultural or biological) to the people from whom the objects in dispute were obtained. Clifford (1988, pp. 277–346) describes a paradigmatic land-claim case from the 1970s in which the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council of Cape Cod, Massachusetts was unable to convince a court of law of its continuous existence as an authentic Indian tribe, and hence of its right to the lands in question. Another paradigmatic case is that of Kennewick Man, 9000-year-old skeletal remains found in 1996 in Kennewick, Washington (Thomas, 2000). Several area Indian tribes claimed the remains for reburial, but were opposed by scientists who argued there was no way to connect the skeletal materials

genetically to living people. The Indian claimants did not prevail and the bones remain at a court-appointed neutral site, in a museum, but not on display.

There have, however, been many successful repatriation projects prompted by NAGPRA and similar laws in other countries. These laws have led to often difficult discussions between representatives of indigenous peoples and museums around the world, some of which have been more willing than others to part with their treasures (Brown, 2003; Clifford, 2013). Repatriation involves not merely a return to a status quo ante, it is a process that requires dialogue and cultural exchange. For example, Canadian museums agreed to return confiscated potlatch objects to the Kwagiulth communities of Vancouver Island that claimed them, but on condition that the Indians build museums to house the treasures (Clifford, 1997, p. 125). Some museums and scholars have steadfastly fought repatriation efforts, on various grounds: that particular cultural treasures “belong” to all humankind (e.g., in the case of the Elgin Marbles in the British Museum); or that no living group can prove a claim to them; or that they were acquired legally. Still, cooperative repatriation processes are ongoing, as, for example, between Cambridge University, where some 450 ethnographic photographs, taken by John Layard in the New Hebrides in 1915, were stored but then made available to the descendants of the people photographed—becoming in the process important artifacts for the “re-invigoration” of local culture (Geismar and Herle, 2010, p. 41).

KEY ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH: REPATRIATIONS OF THE FUTURE

In the relentless development of modern capitalism, “all that is solid melts into air,” Marx wrote famously in the *Communist Manifesto*. But the converse is also true: under capitalism, all aspects of human activity, whether material or immaterial, can be commodified, or turned into objects to be measured, valued, and sold. We may think that the paradigmatic example of cultural heritage is an object in a museum, but more and more, people’s lifeways, knowledge, and spiritual values are being treated as heritage to be protected, copyrighted, and licensed (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2009). At the same time, capitalist objectification works on the natural world in new ways that affect human social groups, through the process of “discovering” and then attempting to patent useful properties of localized flora and fauna, including species crucial to particular groups’ subsistence (Hayden, 2003). It remains to be seen who will control and profit from these new kinds of heritage objects, and what kinds of repatriation struggles may ensue.

It also remains to be seen how the brave new worlds emergent from digital technologies will affect the politics of repatriation. Already in the nineteenth century, various forms of mechanical reproduction made it possible to reproduce unique objects and make them accessible to the masses. Museums today are experimenting with digital technology to share objects, or views of objects, with remote audiences and to make available views of objects that cannot be accessed in the museum itself—for example, the back or underneath of an object on display, a cross-section, or a rotating three-dimensional view. In many cases, museums and the communities that own heritage objects are agreeing to let the museums continue to hold the physical objects while their community owners gain some measure of control over their interpretation. In such situations, the new kinds of access afforded by digital media can create new grounds for cooperative relationships between the nineteenth century institutions that have collected and hoarded culture for many decades, even centuries, and the resurgent twenty-first century communities that now have the means to repatriate the heritage or patrimony they can prove to be theirs.

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RICHARD HANDLER SHORT BIOGRAPHY

Richard Handler I am a cultural anthropologist who studies modern Western societies. My initial fieldwork was in Quebec (1976–1984) where I studied the Québécois nationalist movement. This has led to an enduring interest in nationalism, ethnicity, and the politics of culture. Upon coming to the University of Virginia in 1986, I pursued the latter topic by looking at history museums. Beginning in 1990, I worked with Eric Gable (PhD Virginia 1990) and Anna Lawson (PhD Virginia 1995) on an ethnographic study of Colonial Williamsburg, which is both an outdoor museum and a mid-sized nonprofit corporation. In addition to examining the invention of history and tradition, our study focuses on corporate culture, class, race, and gender.

A different interest is the intersection of anthropology and literature. I have written on Jane Austen's novels, on the literary bent of such noted anthropologists as Ruth Benedict and Edward Sapir, and on the difficulties of writing the ethnography of nationalist movements. Finally, I have had an ongoing interest in the history of American anthropology—in particular, in anthropologists as critics of modernity, and the relationship of our discipline's critical discourse to other intellectual trends. Most recently, I have been writing about the American sociologist Erving Goffman.

Between 2000 and 2010, I served as dean of the undergraduate College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Virginia. From 2009 on, I have been Director of the Program in Global Development Studies, an interdisciplinary social science major in the College of Arts and Sciences at U.Va.

RELATED ESSAYS

History and Epistemology of Anthropology (*Anthropology*), Arjun Appadurai

Authenticity: Attribution, Value, and Meaning (*Sociology*), Glenn R. Carroll
Culture and Cognition (*Sociology*), Karen A. Cerulo

Empathy Gaps between Helpers and Help-Seekers: Implications for Cooperation (*Psychology*), Vanessa K. Bohns and Francis J. Flynn
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States and Nationalism (*Anthropology*), Michael Herzfeld
Social Aspects of Memory (*Psychology*), William Hirst and Charles B. Stone
Funerary Practices, Funerary Contexts, and Death in Archaeology (*Archaeology*), Kirsi O. Lorentz
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