

Trends in the Analysis of Interstate Rivalries

WILLIAM R. THOMPSON

Abstract

The analysis of interstate rivalries is still a relatively new approach to studying conflict in world politics. The basic idea is that a disproportionate amount of interstate conflict is traceable to a very small number of state pairs that engage in recidivistic hostilities. Why not focus more on the recidivists? The question is what should we focus on? Six analytical categories are reviewed. It is argued that we have good foundations in terms of rivalry origins, maintenance/escalation, and termination/de-escalation. We can certainly improve on the foundations but we also need to expand our understanding of rivalry “complexities,” rivalry effects, and domestic rivalries.

INTRODUCTION

Studying interstate rivalries developed in part as a way to reduce some of the noise in world politics. If one wants to analyze patterns of conflict between states systematically and there are approximately 200 states in the world, that means that there are as many as 19,900 possible pairs of conflicting states to examine in a year. However, we know that this is an unreal situation. Most states are either too far away or too remote to have disputes. Is there some way to eliminate the less interesting cases so that we can better focus on the more interesting ones?

One way is to focus solely on adjacent pairs. If two states are not contiguous, it is less likely that they will or could clash. Still, there are important exceptions. Iran and Israel, for instance, need not be contiguous to regard one another as enemies. A somewhat broader net could be cast by looking at regional neighborhoods. Interregional conflict is less likely but the problem here is that some states belong to multiple regions (however defined) and it is not implausible that states located on the fringe of one region could have problems with states on the margins of the next region over. Examples include Nicaragua and Colombia, Spain and Morocco, or China and Vietnam.

Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. Edited by Robert Scott and Stephen Kosslyn.
© 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. ISBN 978-1-118-90077-2.

Looking explicitly at rivalries represents a third approach. Rivalries may be defined as competitive, threatening enemies. To qualify, two states need to regard each other as competitive or operating more or less in the same league. Many weak states may regard powerful threatening states as threatening enemies, whether adjacent or afar, but there is often little that can be done about it. Most of the time, the Finnish need to find ways to accommodate the Russians. Identifying another state as an enemy requires some repeated experience. In other words, the first time two states collide over some mutual interest, it is simply a conflict. Allow the conflict to go unresolved or to fester over time and decision-makers will begin categorizing their adversary as a persistent problem. Add some sense of potential military clash over the persistent problem and you have a rivalry.

There are two or three bonuses associated with rivalry analysis. The first bonus is that there are not that many of them. Fewer than a couple of hundred have existed over the past 200 years. The second bonus is that although a couple of hundred dyads represents less than 1% of the universe in any given year, it turns out that they have been linked to a vastly disproportionate three-fourths of all interstate violence.¹ The third bonus is that not only are rivals the conflict recidivists of the international system, serial clashes between opponents increase the likelihood of conflict escalation to more serious levels of hostility. Rivals are thus the states most likely to clash, to clash repeatedly, and to go to war. They are not only the actors who become involved in conflict but also the most likely culprits. Focusing on them explicitly, accordingly, affords one useful way to reduce the noise in world politics, without sacrificing too much.

In this essay, I try to summarize some of the things that we think we know about rivalries, as well as some of the topics on which our understanding might be improved. We have a respectable base for appreciating rivalry origins, maintenance/escalation, and termination/de-escalation. That does not mean that the base cannot be improved upon, only that it is reasonably solid. Rivalry topics on which we need to know much more include rivalry complexities, rivalry effects, and domestic rivalries.

FOUNDATIONAL RESEARCH

ORIGINS

The study of origins is influenced by a split among researchers on how to empirically identify rivalries. One camp (for instance, Klein, Goertz, & Diehl, 2006) prefers a conflict density approach and requires evidence of some

1. Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007, p. 21) note that 77.3% of the 75 wars since 1816 have represented confrontations between rivals. If we focus only on the twentieth century, the proportion is 87.2 and 91.3% after 1945.

minimal number of militarized interstate disputes within a specified time period to qualify a dyad as a rivalry. The other camp argues (Thompson, 2001) that not all rivalries engage in militarized interstate disputes, or at least to the same extent. Therefore, the identification burden should be placed on determining who decision-makers perceive to be their adversaries. The main advantage of the conflict density approach is that it does not require any analytical intervention beyond accepting the notion that rivals should be equated with the most conflictual state pairs. The main disadvantage is that a rivalry definition predicated on high levels of conflict should prohibit rivalry information being used to explain conflict propensities. Otherwise, one is using conflict to explain conflict, which is more than a bit circular. The perceptual approach, on the other hand, is more subjective and labor intensive but does permit the use of rivalry information to be used to explain variation in conflict.

If a rivalry only begins when it exceeds a conflict density threshold, it is quite possible that the identification assumption could bias our understanding of origins. For instance, if we ask how many rivalries begin at the onset of independence, it is most unlikely that a dyad could possibly satisfy the conflict density expectations immediately. As a consequence, most rivalries would then be coded as beginning later, perhaps much later than independence. Similarly, some rivalries involve multiple issues and the different issues tend to go through different life cycles. It is conceivable that an early issue might not have been associated with sufficient physical conflict to qualify but that the development of subsequent issues might be linked to militarized disputes. The question then becomes whether we should attribute the physical conflict to the subsequent issues, the maturation of time in rivalry, or perhaps the multiple issues that have accumulated over time? It is not a matter of the conflict density approach overtly misconstruing origins questions. It is more a matter of there being some likely bias given the assumptions on timing.²

Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson (2007, p. 78), relying on a perceptual identification of rivalries, report that most rivalries (70.5%) are spatial in nature—that is, they are contests over the exclusive control of territory. A substantial proportion of these cases encompass dyads pitting a minor power against another minor power. Almost 72% of minor power rivalries

2. This observation applies to rivalry termination questions as well. Conflict density-based rivalries end when they no longer satisfy the criteria for qualification although in some cases the termination date is specified as a set number of years after the criteria are no longer met. This approach creates some ambiguity as to precisely when a rivalry should be viewed as having ended. As the conflict density criteria are assessed for a particular period of time, there is also some inevitable ambiguity about the termination status of rivalries that begin toward the end of the assessment period. Have they ended or will they be shown to have been terminated when the assessment period is next extended? Then, there are the cases in which the violence is sporadic. Should each cluster of violence, assuming the conflict density criteria are satisfied for brief intervals of time, be viewed as a new rivalry?

are about spatial issues. However, many rivalries involve multiple issues. Slightly more than half (54%) of the rivalries examined between 1816 and 1999 were positional rivalries, or about contests over relative influence and prestige. All rivalries between major parties were at least partially positional in nature whereas only 43% of minor power rivalries contained some positional element. Almost 41% were characterized by ideological differences. Ideological differences were also more likely in major power rivalries (70%) than in minor power rivalries (40%).³

Many of these rivalries began fairly early. Of 128 rivalries that began after 1816, 72 (56%) began when one or more of the adversaries gained independence. Another 14% began within the first postindependence decade. Overall, 90% had begun within the first three decades after independence. This early onset should not be surprising given the strong orientation toward spatial issues that often involve boundary questions among new states.⁴ Once underway, rivalries tend to persist. The average duration of rivalries over the past two centuries is about 42 years. Major power rivalries tend to last about 55 years on average while minor power rivalries average about 38 years in duration.

Yet if most rivalry issues are spatial in nature, why is it that some territorial disputes lead to protracted conflict and interstate rivalry while others do not? It could be a matter of territorial dispute attributes. For instance, highly valued territory should be more prone to generating rivalries than less valued territory, other things being equal. One possible experiment would be to isolate areas initially low in perceived value and examine what happens when the territory in question abruptly comes to be seen as more desirable. Such an analysis might be limited to prerivalry situations but it could also be useful for examining rivalry escalation dynamics. That is, once a rivalry is underway, is it more likely to escalate if territorial issues become more pressing, as Rasler and Thompson (2006), among others contend?

However, perhaps there is more at stake than just the issues. Miller (2007) argues that the missing links for territorial disputes are groups that are closely associated with the contested space. Minority groups resident on or near a state's boundaries, with co-ethnics across the border bring some agency to clashes over territory. This is all the more the case if weak states are unable to control the demands for incorporation or separatism. Are then spatial rivalries more likely to emerge in the contexts of heterogeneous societies and ethnic groups situated on both sides of a border?

3. A fourth type of rivalry, the interventionary rivalry, was proposed in the study by Thompson and Dreyer (2011, p. 21). These rivalries, located mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, are about adjacent states seeking leverage on decisions in a neighbor usually focused on ethnic groups shared by the two states in conflict.

4. See Senese and Vasquez (2008) and Vasquez (1993), among others, on the significance of territorial issues in understanding interstate conflict.

One of the more interesting new developments in international relations theorizing is an argument called *the territorial peace* (Gibler, 2012). It states that contested boundaries are the roots of preparations for, and involvement in, interstate conflict. Resolve the boundary issues and a pacified external environment will emerge that places much less stress on domestic political systems to prepare for coping with external threats. Just how far the territorial peace and its implications for the internal effects of interstate conflict will take us remains to be seen. Nonetheless, it opens up an excellent opportunity for placing rivalry within a nexus of external threat environment and internal political-economic institutions and processes. Embedding rivalry within a broader context is an attractive alternative to pursuing a slate of stand-alone hypotheses about what stimulates the development of rivalries. It is likely that the explanatory outcome will be much more complex than a straightforward territorial dispute resolution that equals international peace equation. However, in the process of finding out how complex the equation is, we will probably learn a great deal about both rivalry origins and effects.

MAINTENANCE/ESCALATION

Probably the least developed dimension of rivalry analyses is our understanding of how relations between adversaries are maintained over long periods of time. Why do they fluctuate in hostility? What brings about escalations in hostility? What constraints operate to restrain escalations? Of course, answering these questions is tantamount to explaining why conflicts occur—long a major and contested focus in international relations. Focusing on rivalry processes cannot be expected to resolve all of the arguments that we have about what drives conflict processes. It should, however, contribute to their resolution if studying rivalries is on the right track for unraveling the unknowns of hostility dynamics.

A core idea about rivalry maintenance (and perhaps escalation) is that interstate relationships are subject to short- and long-term inertia and reciprocity (Dixon, 1986). Bureaucratic inertia means that state X has some likelihood of behaving toward state Y exactly as it did earlier (both recently and in general) and vice versa. Tit-for-tat dynamics imply that state X will behave toward state Y as state Y has behaved toward state X, and vice versa. Escalation occurs in this instance when state X ratchets up its response to state Y beyond whatever stimulus state Y initially sent to state X. The combination of inertia and reciprocity can be expected to account for about half the variance in dyadic relationships. Thus these core ideas are very useful even if they leave as much unexplained. This same type of work suggests that these processes are relatively invulnerable to the comings and goings of personalities

and administrative regimes. Inertia and reciprocity do not work identically in every regime but they rarely disappear altogether.

An alternative model for maintenance is the basic rivalry level (BRL) argument (Goertz, Jones, & Diehl, 2005). It argues that the nature of conflict is established in clashes early on in the rivalry. As the issues cannot be resolved coercively, the rivalry settles into a BRL that characterizes the antagonism thereafter. An open question is the extent to which the rivalry path dependency is linked to the emphasis on militarized dispute behavior. Would we find BRLs if we examined the month-to-month or year-to-year interactions of rivals using events data? Nonetheless, this model hardly seems incompatible with emphases on inertia and reciprocity.

Rivalry escalation examinations have focused primarily on crises. The basic argument is that serial crisis behavior leads to a greater tendency to escalate to higher levels of conflict (Leng, 1983). Something happens in earlier crises that changes the probability of subsequent crises turning into shooting wars. In addition, the types of factors stressed in Steps to War theory (territorial disputes, alliances, arms buildups) also contribute to rivalry escalation (Colaresi, Rasler, & Thompson, 2007). In sum, we seem to have a better handle on rivalry escalation than on rivalry maintenance—although, no doubt, there is ample room for improvement in both areas.

TERMINATION/De-ESCALATION

We know that about half of the rivalries that have ended have been due to coercion of some kind (Colaresi, Rasler, & Thompson, 2007). If rivalries are viewed as contests, one side was either defeated in war or conceded its inferiority to the stronger adversary. The other half of the terminated pool tend to be de-escalated through negotiations. One or both sides develop incentives to engage in signaling and discussions with its adversarial counterpart. Incentives to negotiate, however, are not enough to bring about de-escalation. Precisely, what is necessary to obtain a successful outcome is a subject on which analysts disagree.

The subject of why or how rivalries de-escalate and terminate has generated a number of competing theories. For instance, Rock (1989) argues that decision-makers are more likely to seek rapprochement if they are confronted with new security threats, the risk of disrupting important economic connections, and the prospect of internal warfare. A catalytic defeat can serve to overcome inertia and a search for alternative strategies. For Orme (2004), decision-makers will be more open to hostility de-escalation if they become pessimistic about their own chances of remaining competitive. Cox (2010) contends that what is needed is a policy failure that increases the perceived

costs associated with maintaining the rivalry and/or improves the political position of decision-makers interested in or open to ending the rivalry.

In situations involving transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes, Mani (2011) expects newly democratic regimes to prefer cooperation abroad and reform/consolidation at home. High costs in the last authoritarian regime and weakened veto players facilitate a consistent and cooperative interaction with rivals that can lead to de-escalation. Rasler, Thompson, and Ganguly (2013) argue that decision-makers develop strategies for coping with adversaries based on external threats, the capabilities of their enemies, and their own capabilities. Expectations about rivals become entrenched. Shocks are needed to break through the inertia. Once new strategies are formulated and tried, reciprocity from the adversary and longer term reinforcement of the benefits linked to the new approach are essential to successful de-escalation and termination.

There are some points of overlap in these arguments. Foreign policy inertia needs to be overcome. New or alternative perspectives need to emerge and ascend in the political hierarchy. However, how these situations are arrived at is where the theories disagree most. Yet, for all the wealth of arguments about termination/de-escalation, we have little in the way of comparative tests of the competing theories.⁵ If more than one theory is able to generate support for its claims, we would need to consider the possibility of more refined theories that can be applied to specific types of rivalries. So far, theories on rivalry termination/de-escalation have assumed that one theory should fit all types of rivalry. Of course, it is also conceivable that all of the theories will prove to be deficient in some respect.⁶ All tests of the relevant theories on this subject, to date, have focused on a limited number of cases.

ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

RIVALRY COMPLEXITIES

There are several ways in which the focus on specific rivalries can be misleading. A rivalry frame emphasizes the relationship between two adversaries but that can introduce a different type of “noise” through distortion. What if the dyad is not the most appropriate structure? There are at least two ways in which alternative frames on rivalry interactions have been explored.⁷ One focuses on triads while the other looks at the dynamics of rivalry fields.

5. Other approaches to termination exist as well—see Armstrong (1993), Bennett (1996), Diehl and Goertz (2000), Lebow (1997), Maoz and Mor (2002), and Kupchan (2010).

6. It is also conceivable that a more generic theory that encompasses all of the different theoretical emphases might be constructed.

7. A third approach suggests that more attention should be paid to “principal” rivalries—the ones that are most important to foreign policy makers (Thompson, 1995).

We do not have an inventory of conflict triangles but some prominent ones come readily to mind. Perhaps the most prominent one was the Cold War interactions of the Soviet Union, China, and the United States. Other examples include Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union or the multiple triangles in South Asia (Pakistan, China, India; Soviet Union, India, Pakistan; United States, India, Pakistan, and so on). The point here is there are plenty of rivalries in these cases but they do not necessarily function along dyadic lines. In a three rival situation, what happens if rivalry A influences rivalries B and C. If one focuses exclusively on rivalry A, potentially valuable explanatory material is lost by ignoring what is going on in rivalries B and C. Unfortunately, not a lot of triadic rivalry analysis has been completed to date. It is difficult to assess how much we may be missing. Obviously, more work on rivalry triangles would be highly welcome.⁸

A focus on the dynamics of rivalry fields is in some ways a generalization of the triadic situation to more complicated structures. There are several ways in which these rivalry field dynamics might be conceptualized. An easy example is the contention that not all rivalries are equally significant in world politics. Alter one central one and there can be reverberations throughout the field of rivalries. The termination of the Soviet-US Cold War rivalry impacted conflicts throughout the world just as the end of the Sino-Soviet rivalry had implications for the maintenance of rivalries in northeast and southeast Asia. Freezing (not terminating) the Egyptian-Israeli rivalry at Camp David changed what has been possible in Middle Eastern politics for several decades. Converting the Franco-Germany rivalry into the core of the European Union presumably altered the nature of European politics for generations to come.⁹

Thompson (2003; Rasler and Thompson, 2014) explores a different interpretation of rivalry field dynamics. In developing a model of the outbreak of World War I, rivalry is highlighted in several ways.¹⁰ Part of the argument is that in complex rivalry fields, nonlinear interactions between and among rivalries can occur that are not unlike the complexities of freeway accidents involving multiple collisions. In the run up to 1914, four chains of rivalries are delineated. One begins with the Russian defeat by Japan and the subsequent refocusing of Russian foreign policy in the Balkans that is linked to six other rivalries. A second stream of rivalries starts with Franco-Italian

8. See, for instance, Dittmer (1981), Goldstein and Freeman (1990), Kisangani and Pickering (2014), Rasler and Thompson (2014), Thompson (2003), Thompson and Dreyer (2011), Maoz, Terris, Kuperman, and Talmud (2007).

9. Thompson (forthcoming) compares the consequences of the de-escalation of three regionally central rivalries: Egypt-Israel, Argentina-Brazil, and France-Germany and argues that economic integration appears to be critical in advancing regional pacification.

10. Vasquez *et al.* (2011) also make use of the increasing number of rivalries in their modeling of World War I's outset.

maneuvering in North Africa and leads to a number of other rivalries operating in the Mediterranean and Balkans. A third cluster of eight European major power rivalries focuses on the bipolarization of the stronger states in the region. The fourth cluster is focused on global and regional leadership rivalries. Metaphorically, the interaction of these clusters of rivalries (within and between the clusters) is likened to the confluence of four streams into a turbulent whirlpool. The sheer complexity of the interactions can be analyzed in retrospect. Whether anyone at the time could have been expected to follow the entire ensemble as it evolved seems most unlikely. In this sense, the old game of blaming one state for primary responsibility in bringing about the war makes little sense. The nonlinear pinball dynamics that emerged in the decade before the outbreak of World War I were not controlled or controllable by any single state.

RIVALRY EFFECTS

Most of the work on rivalries looks at them as the primary focus (for instance, how are rivalry relationships different from nonrivalry relationships) or uses them as a control for intensive conflict. However, rivalries are beginning to appear in theories as variables in more complex arguments. Colaresi (2004) looks at the effect of rivalries on decision-makers who attempt more dovish approaches to foreign policies. Thies (2004), for another example, regards rivalries as a substitute for wars in the third world. In more developed states, wars ratcheted upward the demands on state organizations and thereby served as a principal agent of state-making. Wars in less-developed contexts do not appear to have the same effect. Thies argues, however, that engaging in rivalries has improved state extraction capabilities—thereby serving as a substitute for war making in contributing to state-making.¹¹

Another example is provided by Rasler and Thompson's (2011) work on regional pacification. Why have some regions become relatively peaceful while others remain intensely conflictual? Part of the answer seems to be the relationship between disputed boundaries and rivalries. As boundaries become more accepted or less contested, spatial rivalries lose their *raison d'être*. Yet, this relationship is unlikely to stand in isolation from other domestic and international processes. The question is whether we can unpack how conflict is embedded in the context of domestic institutions and other characteristics such as inequality and democratization. In other words, it seems likely that external threats have had formative impacts on domestic structures and processes (and perhaps vice versa).

11. However, see Kisangani and Pickering (2014) for an alternative interpretation.

DOMESTIC RIVALRIES

One of the interesting extensions of the rivalry idea is to view domestic insurgencies as cases of rivalry. Certainly, rivals and rivalries exist at all levels. However, the application of rivalry arguments to domestic insurgencies, so far, has been limited to the conflict density approach. “Enduring internal rivalries (EIRs)” are defined as conflicts between governments and insurgent groups that persist through at least 10 years of armed conflict and 25 deaths (DeRouen & Bercovitch, 2008). If the identity of the insurgent groups changes during this time, it does not matter as long as the fighting can be linked to the initial onset of civil war. Research in this vein then proceeds to explore the extent to which these protracted insurgencies last longer, recur more often, and kill more people than non-EIRs.

This approach seems problematic from a rivalry perspective. By designating the conflict as the unit of analysis, government-insurgency group relationships are obscured. Presumably, a rivalry perspective would seek to draw attention to the nature of specific internal dyads. Duration and recurrence might easily be traced to a long-running feud between specific groups and their governments. In some cases, DeRouen and Bercovitch’s EIRs are identical to what is being proposed. The Peruvian case is the government-Sendero Luminoso dyad. In Spain, it is government versus ETA or in Mozambique, it was government versus Renamo. Yet, once insurgencies with multiple groups are mixed with cases featuring a single group, control over who is a rival with whom is lost. For instance, civil war recurrence could be linked to attributes of a specific government-insurgent group relationship. Why is it that the Taliban, the IRA, or the LTTE are/were so hard to defeat? In contrast, insurgencies with multiple groups should work much differently, one would think, than civil wars with one prominent rebel organization. Combat between insurgents, divide-and-conquer strategies, and alliances between governments and insurgents, or beleaguered governments fighting small-scale rebellions on multiple fronts might be expected in such cases.

Whatever might be said for the conflict density approach, its application to domestic insurgency seems to sacrifice most of what might be gained by the application of a rivalry perspective. Instead, we are told, somewhat circularly, that longer insurgency cases last longer and tend to recur. The idea of applying a rivalry perspective to domestic conflict is attractive but it has yet to be implemented successfully.

CONCLUSION

Six topical areas of rivalry analysis have been delineated. In terms of origins, we have a pretty good idea of where they come from. For

maintenance and escalation, we appear to have a solid core set of ideas about maintenance and escalation that has received successful treatment. On termination/de-escalation, we are blessed with a large number of rival theories that have yet to be sorted out for their efficiency and explanatory power. Complexities to dyadic forms of rivalry analysis have been introduced but they have yet to receive sufficient attention. The rivalry idea is beginning to diffuse and perhaps is even being mainstreamed into more comprehensive arguments about political development and the interactions of domestic and external processes. Finally, the rivalry perspective has been applied to internal warfare with some success but would probably fare better if distinctions were made between situations encompassing single and multiple rebel groups.

None of these six areas, of course, are in such great shape that they could not profit from more attention. The argument here is only that some of the six are in better shape than some of the others. Rivalry analysis is a healthy and ongoing enterprise even if it is still in its infancy. The six topical areas notwithstanding, however, the real hallmark of success will be when analysts outside of international politics begin paying attention to treating interstate rivalries more explicitly. In this respect, we still have some way to go.¹²

REFERENCES

- Armstrong, T. (1993). *Breaking the ice: Rapprochement between east and west Germany, the United States and China, and Israel and Egypt*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace.
- Bennett, D. S. (1996). Security, bargaining and the end of interstate rivalry. *International Studies Quarterly*, 40, 157–183.
- Colaresi, M. (2004). When doves cry: International rivalry, unreciprocated cooperation, and leadership turnover. *American Journal of Political Science*, 48(3), 535–570.
- Colaresi, M. P., Rasler, K., & Thompson, W. R. (2007). *Strategic rivalries in world politics: Position, space, and conflict escalation*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Cox, E. (2010). *Why enduring rivalries do—or don't end*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- DeRouen, K., Jr., & Bercovitch, J. (2008). Enduring Internal Rivalries: A New Framework for the Study of Civil War. *Journal of Peace Research*, 45, 55–74.
- Diehl, P. F., & Goertz, G. (2000). *War and Peace in International Rivalry*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Dittmer, L. (1981). The strategic triangle: An elementary game theoretical analysis. *World Politics*, 33, 485–515.
- Dixon, W. J. (1986). "Reciprocity in United States-Soviet relations: Multiple symmetry or issue linkage?". *American Journal of Political Science*, 30, 421–445.

12. Earlier attempts to encourage this type of interaction are found in Ganguly and Thompson (2011), Paul (2005), and Thompson (1999).

- Ganguly, S., & Thompson, W. R. (Eds.) (2011). *Asian Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation, and Limitations on Two-Level Games*, edited with Sumit Ganguly. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Gibler, D. M. (2012). *The territorial peace: Borders, state development and international conflict*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Goertz, G., Jones, B., & Diehl, P. F. (2005). Maintenance processes in international relations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49, 742–769.
- Goldstein, J., & Freeman, J. (1990). *Three way street: Strategic reciprocity in world politics*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Kisangani, E. F., & Pickering, J. (2014). Rebels, rivals, and postcolonial state-building: Identifying bellecist influences on state extractive capability. *International Studies Quarterly*, 58, 187–198.
- Klein, J. P., Goertz, G., & Diehl, P. F. (2006). The new rivalry dataset: Procedures and patterns. *Journal of Peace Research*, 43(3), 331–348.
- Kupchan, C. A. (2010). *How enemies become friends: The sources of stable peace*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Lebow, R. N. (1997). Transitions and transformations: Building international cooperation. *Security Studies*, 6, 154–179.
- Leng, R. J. (1983). When will they ever learn? Coercive bargaining in recurrent crises. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 27, 379–419.
- Mani, K. (2011). *Democratization and military transformation in Argentina and Chile: Rethinking rivalry*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Maoz, Z., & Mor, B. D. (2002). *Bound by struggle: Strategic evolution of enduring international rivalries*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Maoz, Z., Terris, L. C., Kuperman, R. D., & Talmud, I. (2007). What is the enemy of my enemy? Causes and consequences of imbalanced international relations, 1816–2001. *Journal of Politics*, 69, 100–115.
- Miller, B. (2007). *States, nations, and the great powers: The sources of regional war and peace*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Orme, J. D. (2004). *The paradox of peace: Leaders, decisions, and conflict resolution*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Paul, T. V. (Ed.) (2005). *The India-Pakistan conflict: An enduring rivalry*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Rasler, K., & Thompson, W. R. (2006). Contested territory, strategic rivalry and conflict escalation. *International Studies Quarterly*, 50, 145–167.
- Rasler, K. and W. R. Thompson (2011). “Boundary disputes, rivalry, democracy, and interstate conflict in the European region, 1816–1994,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 28, 3: 280–305.
- Rasler, K. and W. R. Thompson (2014). “Strategic rivalries and complex causality in 1914,” In J. S. Levy & J. A. Vasquez (Eds.), *The war of 1914: Analytic perspectives on historic debates*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Rasler, K., Thompson, W. R., & Ganguly, S. (2013). *How rivalries end*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Rock, S. R. (1989). *Why peace breaks out: Great power rapprochement in historical perspective*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

- Senese, P. D., & Vasquez, J. A. (2008). *The steps to war: An empirical study*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Thies, C. G. (2004). State building, interstate and intrastate rivalry: A study of post-colonial developing country extractive efforts, 1975–2000. *International Studies Quarterly*, 48, 53–72.
- Thompson, W. R. (1995). Principal rivalries. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 39, 195–223.
- Thompson, W. R. (Ed.) (1999). *Great power rivalries*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Thompson, W. R. (2001). Identifying rivals and rivalries in world politics. *International Studies Quarterly*, 45, 557–586.
- Thompson, W. R. (2003). A streetcar named Sarajevo: Catalysts, multiple causation, chains, and rivalry strategies. *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(3), 453–474.
- Thompson, W. R. (forthcoming). "Rivalry de-escalation, regional transformation, and political-economic forward looking". In: S. Lobell & N. Ripsman (Eds.), *The political economy of regional transitions*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Thompson, W. R., & Dreyer, D. R. (2011). *Handbook of international rivalries, 1494–2010*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
- Vasquez, J. A. (1993). *The war puzzle*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Vasquez, J. A., Diehl, P. F., Flint, C., Scheffran, J., Chi, S.-H., & Rider, T. J. (2011). The conflict space of catyclusm: The international system and the spread of war, 1914-1917. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 7, 143–168.

WILLIAM R. THOMPSON SHORT BIOGRAPHY

William R. Thompson is a Distinguished Professor and the Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University. He is a former editor of *International Studies Quarterly* (1994–1998 and 2008–2013) and a former President of the International Studies Association (2005–2006). Recent books include *Asian Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation, and Limitation on Two-level Games* (Stanford University Press, 2011, edited with Sumit Ganguly), *Handbook of International Rivalries, 1494–2010* (Congressional Quarterly Press, 2011, with David R. Dreyer), *The Arc of War: Origins, Escalation and Transformation* (University of Chicago Press, 2011, with Jack S. Levy), *How Rivalries End* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013, with Karen Rasler and Sumit Ganguly), and *Transition Scenarios: China and the United States in the Twenty-first Century* (University of Chicago Press, 2013, with David P. Rapkin).

RELATED ESSAYS

Political Conflict and Youth: A Long-Term View (*Psychology*), Brian K. Barber
Mediation in International Conflicts (*Political Science*), Kyle Beardsley and Nathan Danneman

- Globalization Backlash (*Sociology*), Mabel Berezin
- Domestic Institutions and International Conflict (*Political Science*), Giacomo Chiozza
- Globalization: Consequences for Work and Employment in Advanced Capitalist Societies (*Sociology*), Tony Elger
- Global Income Inequality (*Sociology*), Glenn Firebaugh
- Interdependence, Development, and Interstate Conflict (*Political Science*), Erik Gartzke
- Globalization of Capital and National Policymaking (*Political Science*), Steven R. Hall
- States and Nationalism (*Anthropology*), Michael Herzfeld
- Reconciliation and Peace-Making: Insights from Studies on Nonhuman Animals (*Anthropology*), Sonja E. Koski
- Why Do States Sign Alliances? (*Political Science*), Brett Ashley Leeds
- Domestic Political Institutions and Alliance Politics (*Political Science*), Michaela Mattes
- Cultural Conflict (*Sociology*), Ian Mullins
- Intervention and Regime Change (*Political Science*), John M. Owen IV and Roger G. Herbert Jr.
- World Trade Organization and Judicial Enforcement of International Trade Law (*Political Science*), Krzysztof J. Pelc
- Postsocialism (*Anthropology*), Elizabeth Cullen Dunn and Katherine Verdery
- Culture and Globalization (*Sociology*), Frederick F. Wherry